• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.115-129
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• 2003

This paper suggests that the profit sharing contract can be Pareto optimal for both supplier and the purchaser. It is shown that Pareto optimal risk sharing contract can be obtained even though the decisions are made in a decentralized manner. The effect of risk attitude of the members of the supply chain is discussed. We examined various aspects of the risk sharing contract such as risk altitude, bargaining power, and cost of information system. The different risk attitude changes the optimal parameters and decision variables. Especially, we proved that, when both the supplier and the purchaser are risk averse, the purchaser orders less quantity than when the one is risk neutral and the other is risk averse. If the fixed cost for the information system is big enough to satisfy a certain condition, it is Pareto optimal not to share the profit and the purchaser takes all the risk even though he is risk averse.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.14 no.9
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• pp.21-30
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• 2023

Purpose: Focusing on the role of the special contract to collaborate the supply chain operations, this study investigates how the revenue sharing contract affects the performance of Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI). Research design, data, and methodology: The optimization model is formulated to represent two stage supply chain system where the supplier and retailer manage the operations to maximize their own profits. Three supply chain models including the traditional system, VMI, and VMI with revenue sharing contract are compared in the numerical examples. Results: According to the numerical analysis, the entire supply chain system has greater profit under VMI than the traditional system, while VMI alone sacrifices the supplier's profit. With the proper sets of revenue share ratio and wholesale price discount rate, VMI with revenue sharing contract results in the increased profit for both supplier and retailer compared with VMI alone as well as the traditional system. Conclusions: The numerical examples imply that VMI, when it is combined with the revenue sharing contract, can be the effective collaboration program that satisfies every supply chain member. To make VMI with revenue sharing contract to be fair to all supply chain members, they need to agree on the appropriate contract content.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.329-337
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• 2021

This research aims to expose the Islamic perspective on the concept of justice on the Mudarabah contract's profit-sharing ratio. In certain verses in Al-Qur'an, Islamic values in Muamalah, the rules dictated by the Qur'an and its practices, and explanations rendered (more commonly known as Sunnah) by the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and Sahabah (the companions of the Prophet Muhammad), and Fiqh Axiom (rules) in Muamalah (Islamic jurisprudence), are used as the instruments of sharia to achieve the study objective. Islamic monetary establishments in Indonesia are still not in full consistency with the Shariah principles, significantly as far as satisfying equity and justice by Islamic banks in mudarabah contract (with clients). The ignominy is the nisbah (ratio) between the capital proprietor and the capital director. There are models or propositions to decide the benefit (profit)-sharing proportion. Nevertheless, none of them explains or specifies the possibility of equity/justice in the profit-sharing ratio. This research utilizes an explorative and subjective methodology that contributes to the philosophical premise of deciding the profit-sharing fairness. The elements of a just ratio for the Mudharabah contract are mutual willingness, the existence of negotiation, and the level of advantages and risks of the labor.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.224-233
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• 2013

In supply chain management, the supply contract can induce collaboration and coordination among the supply chain members in order to optimize supply chain performance. Numerous supply contracts have been examined; however, some difficulties related to the application of these contracts still occur. One of the solutions is to apply the composite supply contract which can assist in the supply chain coordination. This research examines the composite contract of the revenue sharing and quantity flexibility contracts in a two-stage supply chain, which comprises a retailer and a supplier. In this research, a mathematical model of the composite contract is developed; then, the applicability of the proposed composite contract is examined by investigating its capability in terms of supply chain coordination and profit allocation. In the numerical experiments, the composite revenue sharing-quantity flexibility contract showed that it is superior to both component contracts in terms of supply chain coordination and profit allocation among supply chain members.

• Journal of Korean Society for Quality Management
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• v.46 no.4
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• pp.959-972
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• 2018

Purpose: This study developed a simulation model that incorporates the uncertainty of demand and yield to obtain optimized results for supply chain coordination within environmental constraints. The objective of this study is to examine whether yield management for perishable products can achieve the goal of supply chain coordination between a single buyer and a single supplier under a variety of environmental conditions. Methods: We investigated the efficiency of a revenue-sharing contract and a wholesale price contract by considering demand and yield uncertainty, profit maximizing ratio, and success ratio. The implications for environmental variation were derived through a comparative analysis between the wholesale price contract and the revenue-sharing contract. We performed Monte Carlo simulations to give us the results of an optimized supply chain within the environments defined by the experimental factors and parameters. Results: We found that a revised revenue-sharing contracting model was more efficient than the wholesale price contract model and allowed all members of the supply chain to achieve higher profits. First, as the demand variation (${\sigma}$) increased, the profit of the total supply chain increased. Second, as the revenue-sharing ratio (${\Phi}$) increased, the profits of the manufacturer gradually decreased, while the profits of the retailer gradually increased, and this change was linear. Third, as the quality of yield increased, the profits of suppliers appear to increased. At last, success rate was expressed as the profit increased in the revenue-sharing contract compared to the profit increase in the wholesale price contract. Conclusion: The managerial implications of the simulation findings are: (1) a strategic approach to demand and yield uncertainty helps in efficient resource utilization and improved supply chain performance, (2) a revenue-sharing contract amplifies the effect of yield uncertainty, and (3) revised revenue-sharing contracts fetch more profits for both buyers and suppliers in the supply chain.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.20 no.6
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• pp.125-135
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• 2022

Purpose: The revenue sharing contract has been used in various industries and it is expected to coordinate the individual companies' operations in a way to improve the whole supply chain performance. This study evaluates the performance of the revenue sharing contract to find out whether this contract achieves its original goal, the supply chain coordination. Research design, data, and methodology: The profit optimization models are developed to represent two stage supply chain system with a supplier and a buyer. By using the numerical examples of the proposed mathematical models, this study examines whether this supply chain contract coordinates the supply chain system. Results: The numerical examples show that the revenue sharing contract does not make the same supply chain profit as the centralized system does. With the proper combination of the wholesale price discount rate and revenue share ratio, both manufacturer and retailer can obtain increased profits from the revenue sharing contract. Conclusions: The outcomes of the numerical analysis imply that the revenue sharing certainly improves the supply chain performance but it does not fully coordinate the supply chain system. By controlling the wholesale price and revenue share ratio, every supply chain member can be beneficiaries of this supply chain contract.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.41 no.3
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• pp.243-252
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• 2015

This paper considers a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer under the cap-and-trade emissions regulation and a permit supplier. We study joint production quantity and investment in reducing permit production cost decisions for centralized and decentralized supply chains. We formulate two supply chain contracts with aims to coordinate the decentralized supply chain; wholesale price contract and cost-sharing contract. Under the cost-sharing contract, the manufacturer shares a part of the investment in reducing permit production cost and then is allowed to purchase emission permit at a lower price. We analytically find that the proposed cost-sharing contract with reasonable parameters can coordinate the supply chain whereas the wholesale price contract is not desirable to achieve the system-wide profit. Numerical example is followed to support the analysis.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.41 no.2
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• pp.101-127
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• 2016

Irrational ordering decisions of supply chain members have been gaining growing importance in the area of supply chain management. Irrational ordering behaviors that deviate from the profit maximizing decisions in the newsvendor settings have observed with human experiments in recent research. These behaviors can be modeled with several typical decision bias elements. This bias in ordering decisions affects the performance of supply chain contracts designed based on the assumption that the supply chain members make optimal decisions, making it necessary to design supply chain contracts by considering the irrationality. The purpose of this research is to derive a method to design the revenue sharing contract that considers human irrationality in ordering decisions. This research considers a simple two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer, where the supplier is assumed to be perfectly rational while the retailer making newsvendor type ordering decisions displays irrational ordering behaviors. Under this environment, this research analytically models the revenue sharing contract to maximize the total supply chain profit or the supplier's own profits while considering the three decision bias patterns of the retailer, which include the pull-to-center effect, the prospect theory, and the increased subjective sensitivity to the revenue sharing ratio. Irrationality parameters are measured through human experiments based on which and through numerical simulations, we showed that significant improvements in the supply chain performance can be achieved.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.1-17
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• 2005

In this article we consider a supply chain consisting of a risk-sensitive manufacturer and a riskneutral retailer. The manufacturer maximizes her individual expected profit by designing a supply chain coordinating returns contract (SCRC) that consists of (i) a channel coordinating returns policy that maximizes the supply chain joint expected profit, and (ii) a profit sharing arrangement that gives the retailer an expected profit only slightly higher than that in the no returns case so that it is just enough to induce the retailer to accept the SCRC. Thus, the manufacturer captures as high a percentage as possible of the jointly maximum supply chain profit. However, this contract can sometimes lead to the manufacturer's resulting realized profit being lower than that in the no returns case when demand is lower than expected. In this context, even though profit is sufficiently attractive on average, will the risk-sensitive manufacturer ever consider applying a SCRC? Our research raises this question and focuses on designing a SCRC that can significantly increase the probability of the manufacturer's resulting realized profit being at least higher than that in the no returns case.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.85-101
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• 2017

The objective of the Nagoya Protocol is to enhance biodiversity by the mean of economic incentives but there has been yet consistent lack of realized contracts between genetic resource users and holders due to the asymmetric information among the parties. This paper presents a principle-agent model to provide optimal contracts under asymmetric information in order to achieve the sustainable biological resource. The model concludes the royalty contracts over the fixed lump-sum benefit transfer as profit sharing mechanism.